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World
History: Curriculum and Controversy
Peter N. Stearns
George Mason University |
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In the fall of 1994, a commission of historians
designated to define secondary school standards in history issued a thick
book on goals in world history. This, and its companion volume on U.S. history,
quickly drew a storm of protest. Conservative commentators argued that the
world history approach detracted from the special emphasis that was essential
to highlight Western achievements and landmarks. The World Standards were
additionally seen—with some justification—as tending to describe
non-Western civilization traditions positively while recurrently noting
flaws in the Western approach, such as racism or slave trading. In a daunting
99-1 vote, the U.S. Senate denounced the Standards. While the greatest ire
was directed toward the U.S. history product, the Senate ventured its larger
world view in stipulating that any recipients of federal money "should have
a decent respect for the contributions of Western civilization." The resolution
had no legal force, but one observer claimed that the effect on history
education was potentially "chilling."
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As world history has developed as a teaching program,
mainly through survey courses at both high school and first-year college
level, a number of objections have been raised. Many area studies specialists
have worried about the feasibility of such a vast subject, and particularly
about the distortions and simplifications a world history program might
entail in their specialty. Here was one source of the resistance to world
history in Ivy League and comparable institutions. Sheer routine posed another
set of barriers, long compounded by the lack of specific training possibilities
for world history teachers. Many high school teachers were and are intimidated
by world history and also remain attached to subject matter they have long
taught and have come to love. The agonies, for example, about what to do
with the beloved Italian Renaissance, when prodded to convert from European
history to world history, form a case in point.
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But it is the cultural resistance to world history
that has been most interesting and probably, in the long run, most telling
in its curricular impact, sometimes compounded of course by sheer routine-mindedness.
A number of educators, and even more patrons and observers of education,
are convinced that world history threatens the values and knowledge they
find central to a well-conceived history program. For them, the two central
pillars of such a program involve, first, a special emphasis on American
history, usually conceived (at least implicitly) along lines of American
exceptionalism, and second, an appropriate dose of Western civilization.
An educated person, according to this argument, must know a daunting number
of facts about both fields—1,200 or so in U.S. history, and over 1,000
for Western civ, according to conservative education guru Chester Finn.
More broadly, American citizens generally should have a unifying exposure
to some common stories about the West and about American history, and a
fairly explicit sense of the superiority of these traditions over (usually
unnamed) alternatives.
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These attitudes reflect, first, a national establishment
that has had no reason—in obvious contrast to current counterparts
in the European Union—to rethink the importance of specifically nationalist
frameworks for history curricula. Recent federal legislation promoting the
teaching of strictly American history and proposing mandatory training on
topics such as the U.S. constitution show the continued vitality of state-serving
national history. And while increasing numbers of professional historians
are eager to "internationalize" the American history survey to make it more
compatible with companion world history courses, there is little official
sponsorship for these efforts. |
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The widespread attachment to Western civ, the more
direct competitor to world history, is less self-evident, for obviously
the program here is not strictly national. Western civ courses became curricular
staples, first at prestigious universities headed by Columbia, then by reflection
as European history survey courses in many high schools, from the 1920s
onward. They reflected a successful campaign by many historians of Europe,
headed by James Harvey Robinson, to urge Western civ as an essential backdrop
and legitimizer to what was, after all, a rather brief, strictly national,
experience. The United States was also seen in terms of maintaining the
European cultural and political tradition at a time, between the world wars,
when Europe itself seemed unable to do the job. Here again was a reassuring
assignment for an upstart transatlantic republic. Western values—and
the emphasis in the Western civ tradition rested on intellectual and very
general political heritage, not messy details—were fundamental to
American development, and the United States had its additional role as preserver
as well as heir. |
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Curricular history itself, then, explains much of
the conservative attachment to Western Civ and resentment of world history
as interloper. Because world history necessarily reduces the space available
to the West and treats the Western tradition as one among several major
and valid civilizational experiences, it is inherently suspect. Add the
not-inconsiderable dose of West-bashing associated with some world history
efforts, designed to trim the West down to size, and the conflict escalates.
Indeed, something of a vicious circle is often established, with world historians
all the more eager to point out flaws in the West given their opponents'
adamant insistence that West is best. History curricula, then, become one
of the battlegrounds in the notorious American culture wars, between defenders
of a clear tradition, eager to maintain established landmarks for assessing
the knowledge of an educated student, and the advocates of the greater breadth
and considerable relativism of world history.
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Conflict is all the more acute given the relationship
between history curricula and two of the major forces impinging on the contemporary
United States. First, there is the unprecedented flow and diversity in the
immigrant population. For many world historians, an increasingly diverse
student body has been a vital asset, providing voices insisting on historical
treatment of traditions besides that of the West. But for their opponents,
this same mixture makes it all the more imperative that students be exposed
to standard single stories about the national and the Western traditions—history
is designed to Americanize, and world history distracts from and possibly
subverts this task. The same divergence applies to growing complexities
in the United States' world role in a post-Cold War environment. To world
historians, national involvement in global rather than predominantly European
interactions dictates world history as essential perspective. But for their
opponents, this same complexity requires an even fiercer emphasis on the
certainties and superiorities of Western values. This clash gained additional
illustration immediately after 9/11: while most people saw the attacks as
a reason for new curricular attention to Islam and to central Asia, conservatives
like Lynn Cheney explicitly argued that America besieged required ever-stricter
emphasis on the Western verities, without the dilution involved in dealing
with the larger world. The wars continue.
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Several features of world history, as a teaching
program, have complicated the disputes. Despite some previous research pedigree,
world history long developed in the United States primarily as a teaching
field, not buttressed by major research claims. Even the achievements of
the field, in significantly revising our understanding of historical developments
particularly between about 600 C.E. and the 19th century, have
not always been highlighted. This may generate unfavorable contrast with
the more familiar research pedigree of Western civ—beginning with
scholars like Robinson himself. Again in contrast to Western civ., world
history programs took earliest and widest root in state colleges and public
high schools, rather than the most prestigious universities that clung to
well-established Western civ offerings. Again, some potential clout was
lost as a result. These features are transitory, already being amended;
the recent move in the Ivy League toward formal world history programs,
though a belated response rather than a leadership gesture, is a striking
case in point. And research credentials advance steadily as well, along
with, more haltingly, available training programs.
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The central question, of course, is how much the
ongoing culture wars over world history have mattered. On the surface, despite
the rhetorical storms, surprisingly little. Worries that official condemnation
in 1994 would dampen the world history surge proved largely groundless.
The Standards document itself continued to be widely referenced by secondary
school teachers, at least for several years. Two other developments were
particularly noteworthy. First, in the wake of the partial collapse of the
national standards movement, a variety of states issued standards statements
of their own, sometimes with assessment mechanisms attached. Distressingly
(though perhaps understandably given the Standards controversy) professional
historians were relatively rarely involved in developing these materials.
Nevertheless, most state standards referenced world history, not European
history. The state of Texas, perhaps surprisingly, so emphasized world history
that the opportunity to teach strictly European history in high school programs
withered; a somewhat similar situation prevailed in California. And many
individual school districts, for example in Maryland, Virginia, and Massachusetts,
opted strongly for world history goals under the umbrella of a slightly
vaguer state mandate. The second development, still more recent, involves
the installation and rapid success, numerically at least, of the Advanced
Placement World History course. (I was and am involved in this, so a personal
disclaimer here.) The course was launched four years ago, to the largest
student audience of any AP program at roughly 20,000; it has grown massively,
with roughly triple the original number of students involved in the program
this year. This growth has challenged many teachers, some of whom have doubtless
been hastily chosen—in some cases, the least experienced teachers
were dragooned—or incompletely trained. But teacher response to training
opportunities has been impressive as well. Finally, though numerical data
are less firm here, college programs have continued to spread as well.
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Despite the culture wars, in other words, world
history curricula have advanced. Programs like the AP effort and many college
courses have been progressively refined, so that there are many illustrations
of careful periodization, calibrated balance among comparative approaches,
emphasis on contacts, and focus on global forces—moving well away
from the parade of one society after another that remained common just a
decade ago. Diligent efforts by world historians themselves, at both college
and secondary levels; awareness of exciting issues in research and teaching
in the field; the need to respond to the increasing diversity of the student
body; and above all the overwhelming imperative to provide historical perspective
on the complex network of global relationships with which American students
will be engaged, as citizens certainly and often as workers—all these
factors have promoted the world history program even as the culture wars
continue to distract.
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This is not to say, however, that cultural dispute
and other retardant factors have lost their force. Several distortions remain
significant.
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--First, obviously, world history surveys have not
spread as widely as would have occurred with less opposition, particularly
at the introductory college level. While European surveys had never been
ubiquitous, and while they varied far more than Western civ proponents sometimes
acknowledged, it remains true that world history has yet to achieve the
standard place that European surveys could boast two decades ago.
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--More importantly, and here particularly at the secondary
school level, the combination of routine mindedness and the vigorous promotion
of Western values has produced many world history titles that are hollow,
misleading or even intellectually dangerous. The average high school world
history course and textbook—aside from Advanced Placement—is
still 67% Western, which means that other societies and larger, global forces
receive both inadequate and inconsistent treatment. The world is still seen
in terms of Western preponderance and initiative, and occasionally significant
response elsewhere. Distortions are particularly great in the modern era.
The state of California, for example, offers an imaginative world history
program in the early grades, running up to 1500, at which point it abruptly
turns on its heels and becomes elaborately and rather conventionally Western.
And there is always Texas: a state with world history requirements on paper,
but where conservative assessments of textbooks, among other things eager
to slam religions other than Christianity, can constrain presentations for
the whole country because of the power of this particular state adoption
process for texts. Or another example: Virginia's standards of learning
in history have a world label, but the facts they require are almost entirely
Western; school districts that seek a world history experience face a difficult
juggling act, and a two-year window, in order to give students both some
real world history and a decent chance to pass the SOLs. One can debate,
of course, whether a bit of world is better than nothing, but there is reason
to fear that many students are being encouraged to think they know the world
when they do not; honest labeling, of what are still largely Western courses
with a smattering of the West and the rest, might be preferable. |
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--Given the conflicts, there has been little intelligent
discussion of how to relate Western and world history. Proponents on both
sides, eager to overwhelm the other, talk in terms of either-or. Sequential
possibilities have been little explored. Both sides seek to capture both
high school and college entry survey courses, risking among other things
some redundancy for able students. Compromise, other than the unacceptable
West-and-rest approach, may be impossible, but it has not even been seriously
advanced. In my own judgment, a sensible world history approach, genuinely
global but not West-bashing, allows important insights into Western history
not available in turgid European history surveys by themselves; but amid
conflict there is little opportunity to probe the comparative advantages
of newer approaches, particularly at the high school level--Given the conflicts,
there has been little intelligent discussion of how to relate Western and
world history. Proponents on both sides, eager to overwhelm the other, talk
in terms of either-or. Sequential possibilities have been little explored.
Both sides seek to capture both high school and college entry survey courses,
risking among other things some redundancy for able students. Compromise,
other than the unacceptable West-and-rest approach, may be impossible, but
it has not even been seriously advanced. In my own judgment, a sensible
world history approach, genuinely global but not West-bashing, allows important
insights into Western history not available in turgid European history surveys
by themselves; but amid conflict there is little opportunity to probe the
comparative advantages of newer approaches, particularly at the high school
level. |
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--Conflict has also retarded appropriate teacher
training. Too many prospective teachers, who will be called upon to do something
in world history in their high school post, attend colleges where world
history is not offered at all, or is poorly developed. The disjuncture between
teacher needs and many major programs can be shockingly great, and those
college instructors who stubbornly oppose even world history options are
doing their charges, and ultimately their charges' charges, a serious disservice. |
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--Though some hopeful signs have emerged, conflict
has also limited discussion of linking American and world history at the
curricular level. So much energy is taken up merely defending world history
in the first place, against cultural opposition, that the inevitable challenges
of adapting the teaching traditions in American history have been largely
sidestepped. Here too, there is repair work to be done. |
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--Finally, while conflict has not prevented the
growth of world history and—as the best college texts now attest—some
serious thinking about curricular options, it has tended to unduly confine
most discussion of world history in teaching to the survey course level.
As teachers, most world historians are so busy trying to install and defend
their course in the schools or in colleges, that they have paid surprisingly
little attention to a larger world history curriculum beyond the entry stage.
Exception is noted for a growing number of graduate programs or graduate
tracks, but at the level of undergraduate majors the judgment stands. Usually,
the student, interested in world history, who inquires about what to do
after the survey courses is simply shunted to a series of non-Western civilization
surveys. Not a dreadful recourse, but frankly inadequate. Here is where,
aside from continued growth, an ability to escape the snares of cultural
conflict will have the greatest payoff in extending world history curricula
and the perspectives they provide on past and present alike. |
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| References
Lynn Cheney, Telling the Truth: why our culture and our country have
stopped making sense and what we can do about it (New York, 1995);
Ralph Hancock, America, the West, and Liberal Education (Lanham,
MD, 1999); Gary Nash and Ross Dunn, History on Trial: Cultural Wars
and the Teaching of the Past (New York, 1997); Craig Lockard, "World
History and the Public: the national standards debates," http://www.theaha.org/Perspectives/issues/2000;
Peter N. Stearns, Western Civilization in World History (London,
2003); Daniel Segal, "'Western civ' and the Staging of History in American
Higher Education," American Historical Review 106 (2000): 770-805;
Gilbert Allardyce, "The Rise and Fall of the Western Civilization Course,"
American Historical Review 87 (1982): 695-725; Alan Bloom, The
Closing of the American Mind (New York, 1988); Lawrence Levine, The
Opening of the American Mind: canons, culture and history (Boston,
1996); W.B. Carnochan, The Battleground of the Curriculum: liberal
education and the American experience (Stanford, 1993). |
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